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The phenomenon of globalisation has facilitated the transnational movement of capital 
and, consequently, increased tax competition, resulting in a surge in offshore financial 
centres which have fostered a favourable climate for tax evasion and tax avoidance 
schemes. The global loss of revenue occasioned by such schemes is estimated to be 
significant, and there have been several attempts to curtail it through the years. The 
automatic exchange of information in tax matters is generally regarded as being the 
most effective method, by requiring that financial institutions report certain financial 
information from foreign account holders, thus allowing tax administrations to track 
and analyse the foreign investments of tax residents. 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the two main regulations currently in place 
regarding the automatic exchange of financial account information for tax purposes, 
namely the United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and the OECD’s 
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The international tax gap, defined as the difference between the total amount 
of international taxes owed by taxpayers to a government versus the amount the 
government actually receives1, due mainly to international tax non-compliance through 
tax avoidance and/or tax evasion, has been a mounting issue in the past few decades. 
In 2009, rough estimates of the international tax gap indicated that it could range from 
$40 billion to $123 billion2 for the United States alone, the exact number being 
extremely difficult to accurately identify due to the veil of secrecy surrounding the 
activities generating it. 
As taxation is a main source of income for governments all around the world, 
closing the tax gap has become an important challenge for tax administrations. Whilst 
some taxpayers use legal strategies to exploit loopholes (tax avoidance), which allow 
them to pay taxes in countries with a more favourable tax policy, others resort to illegal 
activities (tax evasion) to conceal would-be reportable income. Both schemes, however, 
often make use of the same methodology: the shifting of assets and income to Offshore 
Financial Centres (OFCs), more commonly known as secrecy jurisdictions or tax 
havens. 
OFCs promote an attractive tax system for non-residents whilst guaranteeing 
some degree of opacity regarding financial flows, which in turn undermines the fiscal 
regulations of the jurisdictions which should have profited from the income generated 
 
1 Definition taken from http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/tax-gap.html 
2 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Ref. No. 2009-IE-R001, “A Combination of 
Legislative Actions and Increased IRS Capability and Capacity Are Required to Reduce the Multi-
Billion Dollar U.S. International Tax Gap” (2009). 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2009reports/2009IER001fr.html  
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by the aforementioned non-residents. The phenomenon of globalisation, whilst not 
new, has expended in a way that has given rise to higher capital mobility and thus, 
indirectly, to global tax competition. As it has been said that smaller economies benefit 
from lowering the income taxes for income earned by foreign investors3, both OFCs 
and foreign investors stand to gain from a more competitive global market. 
The flow of capital from foreign investors to low-tax regions by individuals and 
corporations seeking to capitalise on local regulations, in order to somewhat conceal 
their wealth and profit, has translated into a colossal loss of revenue for many 
governments. A study from 2018 assessed the global loss of tax revenue as a result of 
corporate tax avoidance and aggressive tax planning through profit shifting to be 
around $500 billion per year.4 On the other hand, the most conservative estimate on 
the global amount of individual wealth held offshore, calculated by economist Gabriel 
Zucman, indicated that $8.7 trillion were stashed offshore by the end of 2016, of which 
around $1.4 trillion were owned by U.S. residents and $2.5 trillion by Europeans. That 
is 8% of the world financial wealth held offshore and an estimated global tax revenue 
loss of $170 billion, with only 25% of offshore wealth being declared.5 
Moreover, the use of OFCs is also of socio-political importance as, additionally 
to tax revenue losses, the capital outflow from higher-tax regions to OFCs has been 
linked to a number of criminal activities such as money laundering, corruption and 
terrorism financing. In December of 2016, the European Commission indicated that 
up to 70% of money laundering cases in Member States had a transnational dimension.6  
 
3 CRUZ, José Manuel Neves. “A concorrência fiscal prejudicial dos paraísos fiscais e o 
desenvolvimento da cooperação internacional em termos de troca de informação”, (pp. 127-157). 
Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto, Vol. 11 (2014). 
4 COBHAM, Alex and JANSKÝ, Petr. “Global distribution of revenue loss from corporate tax 
avoidance: re-estimation and country results: Global Corporate Tax Avoidance.” Journal of International 
Development, 30. 206-232. 10.1002/jid.3348, (2018). 
5 ZUCMAN, Gabriel. “La richesse cachée des nations : Enquête sur les paradis fiscaux”. Seuil, 2017.  
6 European Commission. “Security Union: Proposal for a Directive on countering money laundering 
by criminal law – Questions & Answers” (21/12/2016). 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/MEMO_16_4452  
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Global tax cooperation and fiscal transparency is therefore essential for tackling 
the global issues originating from the use of OFCs and curtailing illicit financial flows. 
The European Union Savings Directive, implemented in 2003, is said to have paved 
the way for international cooperation on tax matters through the automatic exchange 
of information (AEOI). However, it was the introduction of the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010, which aimed to identify instances of tax evasion by 
American individuals and corporations with offshore accounts, that became the turning 
point in addressing the issue of global tax compliance. A few years later, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) followed suit by 
developing what would become the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), which was 
first implemented in 2017. 
Both FATCA and CRS are presently global transparency initiatives that require 
Foreign Financial Institutions to automatically report financial account information of 
specific account holders that are subject to reporting, as per the content of the 
regulations. Financial Institutions are instructed to implement exhaustive due diligence 
measures intending to hinder any attempt by account holders to bypass the reporting. 
The FATCA and CRS obligations are therefore an expansion of the pre-existing know-
your-customer (KYC) requirements that Financial Institutions have to fulfil, mainly 
due to the added need for constant monitoring and reviewing of account holders’ 
information and accounts, whereas KYC processes often simply follow a model of 
periodic reviews based on clients’ risk-rating. 
Since their introduction, Financial Institutions have been striving to conform to 
the newest AEOI stipulations, but they still face many hurdles in regards to their 
practical implementation. 
The aim of this thesis will be to analyse the FATCA and CRS regulations and 
to assess their impact on financial institutions. Following the present introductory 
chapter, Chapter 2 begins with a review of the socio-political and economic context 
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that led to the development of FATCA and CRS, in the periods before and after the 
year 2008. 
Chapter 3 offers an in-depth exposition of the concept of automatic exchange 
of financial account information for tax purposes, followed by a description of FATCA 
and CRS, a summary of their provisions and a breakdown of their domestic and 
international legal frameworks. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the 
main differences between both regulations. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the assessment of the impact created by the 
introduction of the new regulatory requirements on financial institutions. The chapter 
discusses the financial institutions’ increase in expenditures due to compliance costs, 
the difficulties encountered during the implementation of the reporting requirements, 
the penalties associated to non-compliance and the eventual methods that could be 
adopted in order to mitigate the impact. 
Subsequently, Chapter 5 goes on to review the current state of FATCA and 
CRS and offers suggestions on which future additions could be made to optimize 
AEOI in tax matters. 
Chapter 6 presents a summary of the topics discussed throughout this 
dissertation, followed by concluding remarks.  
  





This chapter presents an overview of the global socio-political and economic 
context having led to the development of FATCA and CRS by the IRS and the OECD 
respectively. Whilst the year 2008 appears to have been a critical juncture in the history 
of global tax transparency, partly due to an upsurge in tax scandals and to the perceived 
contribution of OFCs to the financial crisis, the evasion and avoidance of taxation is 
an old permeating issue that governments have been aware of since long before then. 
2.1. Pre-2008 
The origins of OFCs can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, 
specifically to the United States of America where the states of New Jersey and 
Delaware were the firsts to adopt more permissive, “liberal” incorporation laws, 
devising the concept of “easy incorporation” for the purpose of attracting more non-
resident corporations.7 Together with the added concepts of “British virtual 
residencies” and “Swiss bank secrecy”8, which emerged at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the foundation for the development of OFCs was laid. 
On June 19, 1936, then-French Minister of Finance Vincent Auriol addressed 
the House of Representatives in a discourse in which he promoted international 
 
7 PALAN, Ronen. “The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires”, 
(pp. 101-105). Cornell University Press; 1 edition (2003). 
8 Ibid. 
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cooperation in tax matters, promising “negotiations with the governments of 
neighbouring countries to prevent and repress, together, tax fraud and evasion.”9 
On June 1, 1937, then-President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt 
wrote a message to the United States Congress regarding tax evasion and tax avoidance 
issues that had been identified during a preliminary study of income tax returns for the 
year 1936. In his message, the President expresses concerns regarding the fact that the 
study “reveals efforts at avoidance and evasion of tax liability, so widespread and so 
amazing both in their boldness and their ingenuity, that further action without delay 
seems imperative.” The message then goes on to quote a letter the Secretary of the 
Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., addressed to the President, wherein he identifies “the 
device of evading taxes by setting up foreign personal holding corporations in the 
Bahamas, Panama, Newfoundland, and other places where taxes are low and 
corporation laws lax” as one of the “devices” used by taxpayers aiming to avoid 
compliance.10 
Despite the awareness of world leaders regarding the issues relating to OFCs, 
attempts to curtail them were feeble at best, and many new regions mimicked the same 
model, aiming to replicate the success of early adopters. By the end of the twentieth 
century, a considerable increase in financial globalisation translated into a growth in 
financial interconnectedness.11 A 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition by the 
OECD found that the “participation in [tax havens was] expanding at an exponential 
rate” and that “foreign direct investment by G7 countries in a number of jurisdictions 
in the Caribbean and in the South Pacific island states, which are generally considered 
 
9 FARQUET, Christophe. “La défense du paradis fiscal suisse avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale : une 
histoire internationale”, (pp. 398) (citation translated by the author). Editions Alphil Presses Universitaires 
Suisses (2016). 
10 Franklin D. Roosevelt. “Message to Congress on Tax Evasion Prevention” (01/06/1937).  
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-congress-tax-evasion-prevention  
11 The International Monetary Fund’s Strategy, Policy, and Review Department and the Monetary and 
Capital Markets Department, in collaboration with the Statistics Department and in consultation with 
other Departments. “Understanding Financial Interconnectedness” (2010). 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/100410.pdf  
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to be low-tax jurisdictions, increased more than five-fold over the period 1985-1994”.12 
The 1998 Report also found that the key factors of harmful tax competition were 
jurisdictions having “no or low tax rates”, “ring fencing regimes”, a “lack of 
transparency” and a “lack of effective exchange of information”. Luxembourg and 
Switzerland, both member countries of the OECD, stated their disagreement with the 
findings of the Report and informed that they would not be bound by its 
recommendations. This decision showed continuity with later, similar refusals of OFCs 
regarding the signing of exchange of information bilateral treaties with other countries, 
as would be encouraged by the OECD. 
The 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition by the OECD was an important 
first step in the crackdown on low-tax jurisdictions. It’s the first of its kind emphasising 
tax havens and defining the concept, and it originated the Forum on Harmful Tax 
Practices, which not only identified a list of tax havens, but also encouraged non-
member countries to embrace the Report’s recommendations as well. It was a 
precursor of the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum), created in 2000. 
The Global Forum, comprised at the time of its creation of 32 members (both 
OECD members and international financial centres), had for objective to work on the 
implementation of international standards on transparency and exchange of 
information for tax purposes, which would then be the basis for the signing of treaties 
between jurisdictions. One of the first action taken by the Global Forum was to 
threaten economic sanctions on the 35 countries identified as OFCs by the Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices, if they did not agree to commit to implement the OECD 
standards on transparency and effective exchange of information for tax purposes. 
However, the political climate was not particularly propitious at the time, and the 
OECD’s project quickly got entangled in political red tape, facing considerable 
 
12 OECD. “Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue”. OECD Publishing, Paris, (1998). 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264162945-en. 
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backlash from its opponents, including the OFCs themselves. Whilst OFCs with low 
levels of sovereignty seemed to comply with the requirements set out by the Global 
Forum so as to be taken off the blacklist, smaller independent OFCs decried the Global 
Forum’s threats of sanctions, classifying them as an exercise in “economic 
imperialism”, deploring the OECD’s disregard for the principle of sovereignty and 
denouncing the fact that no OECD member was on the blacklist.13 
Once the United States withdrew their support for the Global Forum, citing 
that their pursuits were “not in line with the administration's priorities” following the 
transition from the anti-tax havens Clinton administration to the Bush administration, 
all aspirations of economic sanctions were abandoned,14 and the remainder of the 
project was pursued in a more subdued approach. By April 2002, through negotiations 
and due in part to a change in political leadership in some of the blacklisted 
jurisdictions, the Global Forum managed to bring the number on the blacklist down 
to seven, the remaining jurisdictions having committed to the OECD standards on 
transparency and exchange of information. The victory wasn’t total, however, as not 
only was one of the standards’ stipulations that all OECD member countries would 
have to abide by the same rules for it to be binding (including Switzerland and the 
United States)15, but the standards itself were lacking, being based on Exchange of 
Information on Request (EOIR), which implied that information about taxpayers 
could only be exchanged between two signatories of a treaty if the party requesting the 
information had reasonable cause to suspect that a resident of its country was engaged 
in tax evasion practices. The specificities of the standards lowered the probability of 
detecting tax evasions, with such constraints being acknowledged by advocates of the 
 
13 VAN FOSSEN, Anthony B. “Money Laundering, Global Financial Instability, and Tax Havens in 
the Pacific Islands”, (pp. 237-275). The Contemporary Pacific, 15(2) (2003). 
14 SHAXSON, Nicholas. “Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men who Stole the World” (pp. 203-
205). Palgrave Macmillan (2011). 
15 Ibid. 13 
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OECD who emphasised that even a low probability could be enough to deter any 
attempts.16 
At around the same time, in January 2001, the United States unilaterally 
implemented the “Qualified Intermediary System” which required Qualified 
Intermediaries (QI) having signed a withholding agreement with the IRS to report any 
U.S. source of income of U.S. customers and to apply a withholding tax on payments 
from U.S. source to foreign customers. This system was, however, riddled with 
loopholes, namely the fact that it only applied to U.S. sources of income, which made 
it quite inefficient.17 
Finally, in 2003, the European Union (EU) introduced the Savings Directive, 
the first legislative act setting out to implement a transnational automatic exchange of 
information regarding tax matters. Whilst the directive was of very limited scope (the 
“taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments on debt claims”18 made 
in one Member State to an individual whose tax residence was in another Member 
State), it became an important precedent that indubitably facilitated the later 
implementation of the CRS. 
2.2. The 2008 Shift in Political and Economic Climate  
In 2008, a synchronous conjuncture of events took place, engendering an essential shift 
in the political climate regarding the necessity of adopting a stricter approach towards 
OFCs, which would later lead to the development of FATCA and CRS. 
 
16 JOHANNESEN, Niels, and ZUCMAN, Gabriel. "The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the 
G20 Tax Haven Crackdown" (pp. 69). American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (1) (2014). 
17 HARVEY, J. Richard Jr. “Offshore Accounts: Insider's Summary of FATCA and Its Potential 
Future” (pp. 474-476). Villanova Law Review, Vol 57, Issue 3 (2012). 
18 Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments. OJ L 157, 26.6.2003, (p. 38–48). 
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2.2.1. LGT and UBS Tax Scandals 
The first event started to unfold in 2006, when an individual approached the 
German’s Federal Intelligence Service with a detailed list of information relating to 
illicit financial flows made by German customers of the LGT Group, a financial 
institution based in the then-blacklisted principality of Liechtenstein. Once the ensuing 
investigation became public when, in February 2008,  high-profile raids were conducted 
by German authorities based on suspicions of tax evasion, the German government 
announced that it would share the information garnered with the governments of other 
countries whose residents appeared to be involved.19 The scandal quickly spread to the 
international stage, with the United States’ IRS announcing that several members of 
the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration were working together on combating off-
shore tax avoidance and evasion and that “enforcement action” was being initiated 
with respect to more than one hundred U.S. taxpayers in connection with accounts in 
Liechtenstein.20 
A second scandal broke in May of 2008 when the United States Department of 
Justice (DOJ) charged former UBS private banker Bradley Birkenfeld with tax evasion 
conspiracy. The actions of the DOJ were later vastly criticised, as Birkenfeld had first 
approached the U.S. government in 2007, seeking to reveal crucial information regarding 
UBS’ illicit practices whilst taking advantage of the whistle-blower provisions of the newly 
implemented Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006. When Birkenfeld requested 
immunity for his own involvement, the DOJ denied him, instead later sentencing him to 
40 months in prison.21 Despite his criminal treatment, Birkenfeld’s volunteering of insider 
 
19 “Liechtenstein Tax Scandal Spreads Across Europe”. Deutsche Welle (25/02/2008). 
https://p.dw.com/p/DD1A  
20 IRS News Release. “IRS And Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein Accounts”, IR-2008-26 
(26/02/2008). https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-08-026.pdf  
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information was pivotal to the IRS prosecution of UBS, which later led to the disclosure 
of an unprecedented amount of information regarding 4,450 U.S. clients with offshore 
accounts at UBS, a first in the history of Swiss bank secrecy, and drove UBS to agree to 
pay $780 million to settle criminal charges with the DOJ.22 It is important to note that 
UBS AG had entered a QI Agreement with the IRS in January of 2001, highlighting once 
more the lack of effectivity of the QI System.23 
These two tax scandals – the firsts of many – helped fuel the efforts in tackling 
the issue of OFCs by uncovering essential information regarding tax evasion practices 
performed under the flag of banking secrecy laws.  
2.2.2. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
The causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis, often labelled as the worst worldwide 
economic disaster to have happened since the Great Depression, are diverse and 
complex, ranging from excessive risk-taking by financiers to regulators’ lack of 
oversight. In 2009, at the peak of the crisis, as governments struggled to bailout the 
financial sector and society at large was still reeling, OFCs found themselves the target 
of public anger. Global leaders and economists alike were quick to point the finger, 
accusing OFCs of having somehow contributed to the collapse. Renowned economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, seemed 
to indicate that the blame partially laid on the secondary shadow banking system 
present  in OFCs.24 In a speech addressing the issue of the financial crisis, then-French 
 
22 BROWN, Tom. “Prosecution of UBS informant seen backfiring on U.S.”. Reuters (09/10/2009). 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ubs-tax-birkenfeld/prosecution-of-ubs-informant-seen-
backfiring-on-u-s-idUSTRE59839720091009  
23 The United States of America vs. UBS AG, Exhibit C. Case No. 09-60033-CR-COHN (2009) 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1114446/000095012310024462/y83129exv4w1.htm  
24 SCHÄFER, Ulrich. “Die Wall Street hat den Krieg der Worte verloren”. Süddeutsche Zeitung 
(17/05/2010). https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/joseph-stiglitz-zur-finanzkrise-die-wall-street-hat-
den-krieg-der-worte-verloren-1.710585  
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President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that, in order to rebuild, “it will also be necessary 
to ask upsetting questions like that of tax havens”.25 Eventually, reputable news sources 
also published articles drawing a link between OFCs and the crisis.26 
The correlation between both issues was not, however, universally 
acknowledged. A study from the Institute of Economic Affairs, authored by fourteen 
leading economists, indicated that the origin of the crisis could be traced back to 
government failure. In a statement published in The Telegraph, the authors of the study 
declared: “The prevailing view amongst the commentariat […] that the financial crash 
of 2008 was caused by market failure is both wrong and dangerous” and “no significant 
changes are needed to the regulatory environment surrounding hedge funds, short-
selling, offshore banks, private equity or tax havens”.27 
Whether the OFCs were in part responsible for the collapse or not, the 
backdrop of the financial crisis gave governments a fresh impetus to promote some 
form of global cooperation and transparency in tax matters. The fact that some 
financial entities with offshore activity now had to be bailed out did not go unnoticed, 
and the popular opinion was negatively impacted. President Sarkozy asserted, during 
an European Council meeting in October of 2008, that “it would not be normal for a 
bank to which we would grant our own funds to continue to work in tax havens.”28 
The crisis also put extraordinary pressure on government revenues, and the revenue 
 
25  “Déclaration de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, sur la crise financière internationale 
et la politique économique de la France, à Toulon le 25 septembre 2008”. 
https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-11669-fr.pdf  
26 PICCIOTTO, Sol. “How tax havens helped to create a crisis”. Financial Times (05/05/2009) 
https://www.ft.com/content/96ec9414-39a6-11de-b82d-00144feabdc0  
ROBERTS, Dan. “Five reasons why tax havens and the banking crisis are linked”. The Guardian 
(17/03/2009). https://www.theguardian.com/business/dan-roberts-on-business-
blog/2009/mar/17/tax-banking-crisis  
27 ALEXANDER, James et al. “Economists' letter spells out what went wrong”. The Telegraph 
(11/05/2009). https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/recession/5309591/Economists-letter-spells-
out-what-went-wrong.html  
28 Assemblée nationale, XIIIe législature, Session ordinaire de 2008-2009, Compte rendu intégral : 
Première séance du mardi 21 octobre 2008. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cri/2008-
2009/20090027.asp#P165_21556  
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loss caused by the capital flow to OFCs could help finance the bailouts of failing 
financial institutions. Then-Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey confirmed in 
an interview in Tribune de Genève that the crackdown on OFCs would be “the logical 
consequence of the financial crisis”, as countries would be looking for a way to finance 
their bailout plans.29 
In January of 2009, the inauguration of Barack Obama as President of the 
United States marked a pivotal moment in moving this endeavour forward, as President 
Obama was vocal in his stance against tax noncompliance through offshore tax havens, 
having co-sponsored the American “Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act” when he was still a 
Senator.30 His somewhat populist stance was in alignment with the substantial change 
in the political climate that occurred following the LGT and UBS tax scandals, as well 
as the financial crash. On March 23, 2009, ahead of the G20 London Summit, President 
Obama wrote an op-ed urging the G20 leaders to follow the United States’ lead in a 
“coordinated international action” to restore the economy and prevent a new crisis, in 
which he pressed “we must crack down on offshore tax havens and money 
laundering”.31 This sentiment was later echoed in the London Summit’s Leaders’ 
Statement, on April 2, 2009, wherein a readiness “to take action against non-
cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens” and “to  deploy  sanctions  to  protect  
our  public  finances  and financial  systems” was conveyed, followed by the 
proclamation that “the era of banking secrecy is over”.32 
 
29 “Experts: Obama Will Demand End to Swiss Banking Secrecy”. Deutsche Welle (11/11/2008). 
https://p.dw.com/p/FruR  
30 U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. “Levin, Coleman, Obama 
Introduce Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 681)” (17/02/2017). 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/levin-coleman-obama-
introduce-stop-tax-haven-abuse-act-s-681  
31 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. “President Obama Op-Ed: A Time for Global 
Action” (24/03/2009). https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-
op-ed-a-time-global-action  
32 G20 Communiqué. “London Summit – Leaders’ Statement” (02/04/2009). 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf  
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The threat of economic sanctions by the G20 on OFCs finding themselves on 
the Global Forum’s blacklist had an undeniable effect as, in just five days, all remaining 
blacklisted OFCs signed the mandatory 12 Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEA) on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes in order to be 
identified as compliant. However, around a third of the TIEAs appeared to have been 
signed between OFCs, indicating that some OFCs only did the strict minimum to meet 
the requirements to be removed from the blacklist.33 The TIEAs were also limited to 
the Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), which was decried by many as not 
being exceedingly effective. 
In October of the same year, the Obama administration introduced the first 
draft of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, an “[amendment to] the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to prevent the avoidance of tax on income from assets held 
abroad”,  in the United States Senate.34 This would open the door for the development 
of the CRS a few years later. 
 
33 Ibid. 16 
34 Senate Bill 1934 - Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009 (27/10/2009). 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/1934  
  





The Automatic Exchange of Information 
This chapter focuses on the concept of automatic exchange of financial account 
information for tax purposes and provides further insight regarding the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act and the Common Reporting Standard, their legal 
frameworks and the main differences between both. 
3.1. What is it? 
The automatic exchange of financial account information for tax purposes is a 
direct successor of the Exchange of Information on Request principle, with a much 
wider range of application. Whereas EOIR is restricted to well-founded requests 
regarding limited financial information of individuals suspected of tax noncompliance, 
prohibiting so-called “fishing expeditions” and requiring the requesting party provides 
proof of “foreseeable relevance” i.e. a nexus between the requested information and 
an open inquiry or investigation,35 AEOI is the routine, automatic transmission of pre-
determined financial account information of account holders subject to reporting as 
per each specific AEOI agreement, without prior request. 
FATCA and CRS are AEOI initiatives seeking to promote a global 
implementation of the AEOI approach in tax matters as a means to attain some form 
 
35 OECD. “Implementing the Tax Transparency Standards: A Handbook for Assessors and 
Jurisdictions, Second Edition” (pp. 165-166). OECD Publishing, Paris (2011). 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264110496-en 
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of cross-borders tax transparency, effectively allowing tax authorities to properly  
identify and investigate any attempt of tax noncompliance, therefore reducing the loss 
of tax revenue and curtailing illicit activities. 
3.2. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act 
U.S. tax gap estimates for the year 200136 found that compliance was much 
higher with regards to amounts subject to third-party information reporting and 
withholding – findings which were later confirmed in the tax gap estimates of 
subsequent tax years.37  FATCA is, in a way, a broader redesigning of the unilateral 
Qualified Intermediary System adopted in the United States in 2001, targeting tax 
noncompliance by U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts through third-party reporting 
by Foreign Financial Institutions. The QI regime was expanded to close down on 
previously identified loopholes, to broaden the definition of financial intermediaries, 
and to introduce a withholding tax on U.S. source payments made to Foreign Financial 
Institutions (FFIs) refusing to enter an agreement with the IRS and comply with the 
reporting requirements.38 However, it was soon noted that a few of the new provisions 
laid out by the regulation implied that some FFIs would have to violate local legislation 
in order to comply. For example, FFIs were expected to terminate the accounts of any 
recalcitrant account holder – i.e. account holders refusing to provide any 
documentation – and to report the information of U.S. persons identified by other 
 
36 IRS, Office of Research. “Tax Year 2001 Federal Tax Gap Overview” (02/2007). 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01rastg07map.pdf  
37 IRS, Office of Research. “Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 
2011–2013”, Publication 1415 (Rev. 9-2019) Catalog Number 10263H (pp. 13) (09/2019). 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf  
38 Ibid. 17, (pp. 479-482) 
  




means to the IRS.39 In an effort to settle this issue, the U.S. government began to 
examine the viability of coordinating with foreign governments so as to adopt an 
intergovernmental approach to FATCA, as opposed to the unilateral system between 
the United States and FFIs which had previously been in use.40 Bilateral agreements 
were drawn up and the full implementation of FATCA, which was to become effective 
in 2013, was instead phased until 2017.41 
3.2.1. FATCA Domestic and International Legal Framework 
FATCA was first enacted into law on March 18, 2010, under Title V (Subtitle 
A, §§ 501-541) of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act (Public 
Law n.º111–147).42 The HIRE Act is a U.S. legislation that was meant to reduce the 
rate of unemployment that had spiked due to the 2008 financial crisis, and FATCA was 
initially introduced as a means to generate revenue that would be allocated to offset the 
cost of the hiring incentives provided by the law. 
FATCA was codified in the Internal Revenue Code and a series of provisions 
were added or amended. Section 6038D was added to Subtitle F43, requiring U.S. 
taxpayers holding “any interest in a specified foreign financial asset”44 to report specific 
information regarding such asset if the aggregate value of all assets exceeds $50,000 
(the amount varies depending on the marital status and residence of the U.S. taxpayer). 
 
39  26 U.S. Internal Revenue Code § 7701 (a) (1). “The term “person” shall be construed to mean and 
include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.” 
40 U.S. Treasury Department “Joint Statement from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom regarding an intergovernmental approach to improving international tax 
compliance and implementing FATCA” (02/07/2012). https://bit.ly/3c0nyxU  
41 IRS Notice 2013-43 (2013). https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-43.pdf  
42 Public   Law   No.   111-147, Tit.   V, Subtit.   A §§ 501-535, 124 Stat.  97-115 (2010) 
https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ147/PLAW-111publ147.pdf#page=27  
43 26 U.S. Code § 6038D. Information with respect to foreign financial assets. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2016-title26/pdf/USCODE-2016-title26-
subtitleF-chap61-subchapA-partIII-subpartA-sec6038D.pdf  
44 Ibid., article b.   
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
30 
 
A fourth chapter on “Taxes to Enforce Reporting on Certain Foreign Accounts” 
(Chapter 4) was added to Subtitle A45. Sections 1471 and 1472 added the requirement 
that a 30% tax should be withheld by the withholding agent with regards to any 
withholdable payment46 made to a recalcitrant account holder, a Foreign Financial 
Institution that is nonparticipating47 or a Non-Financial Foreign Entity (NFFE)48 that 
either a) did not provide proof that it does not have any substantial U.S. owners or b) 
did not provide the required information regarding its substantial U.S. owners.49 
An online system was created to facilitate the registration of FFIs and NFFEs 
with the IRS and each registered institution and entity was given a Global Intermediary 
Identification Number (GIIN), allowing them to identify themselves for FATCA 
reporting purposes. The FFI List, which is controlled by the IRS, is of public access 
and can be consulted by withholding agents to verify the status of an institution or 
entity, in accordance with Chapter 4 provisions.50 
In order for the FFIs to be able to comply with the Chapter 4 reporting 
requirements when local banking and privacy laws may become an obstacle (e.g. the 
EU Data Protection Directive), the U.S. Department of Treasury entered numerous 
bilateral Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) based on two main models (Model 1 
 
45 26 U.S. Internal Revenue Code Chapter 4. “Taxes to Enforce Reporting on Certain Foreign 
Accounts”. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2016-title26/pdf/USCODE-2016-
title26-subtitleA-chap4.pdf  
46 26 USC § 1473(1)(A). “In general The term “withholdable payment” means— (i) any payment of 
interest (including any original issue discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, 
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical 
gains, profits, and income, if such payment is from sources within the United States, and (ii) any gross 
proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any property of a type which can produce interest or 
dividends from sources within the United States.” 
47 An FFI that did not register with the IRS under FATCA. 
48 Ibid. 45, § 1472. “Withholdable payments to other foreign entities”. The term “non-financial foreign 
entity” means any foreign entity which is not a financial institution. 
49 Ibid. 45, § 1473. For definitions of the terms “withholdable payment”, “substantial U.S. owner” and 
“withholding agent”. 








and Model 2). Both models highlight the terms of the agreement, the obligations with 
respect to the obtention and automatic exchange of information regarding reportable 
accounts, the time and manner in which the exchange must be made and the specific 
application of FATCA to be undertaken by financial institutions covered by the 
agreement. In a Model 1 IGA, the financial institutions of a foreign government have 
to report the reportable accounts information to such government, which will then 
transmit it to the IRS through AEOI. In a Model 2 IGA, the foreign government 
amends its laws for the purpose of allowing its FFIs to register and report directly to 
the IRS, in pursuance of the requirements of an FFI agreement.51 As of May 2020, 113 
jurisdictions had signed an IGA with the United States. The jurisdictions in question 
then have to carry out the necessary internal constitutional formalities for the 
implementation of the agreement’s provisions into national law.52 In the case of 
Portugal, for example, a Model 1 IGA was signed by the two governments on August 
6, 2015, 53  which was then approved by the Assembly of the Republic on June 17, 
2016, and ratified by the Decree of the President of the Portuguese Republic n.º 
53/2016.54 The IGA then became effective on August 31, 201655 and the Decree-Law 
n.º 64/2016, of 11 October was published56, approving complementary regulations as 
per article 16º of the “Financial Information Communication Regulation”57 (RCIF) 
 
51 An agreement concluded between an FFI and the IRS in accordance to Chapter 4 provisions. 
52 List of IGA Jurisdictions https://home.treasury.gov/about/offices/tax-policy/foreign-account-tax-
compliance-act  
53 Resolução da Assembleia da República n.º 183/2016. Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 150 — 5  de  
agosto  de  2016. https://dre.pt/application/file/a/75106060. Model 1 IGA 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/FATCA-Agreement-Portugal-8-6-2015.pdf   
54 Decreto do Presidente da República n.º 53/2016 de 5 de agosto. Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 
150 — 5 de agosto de 2016. https://dre.pt/application/file/a/75106058  
55 Negócios  Estrangeiros, Aviso n.º 101/2016. Diário da República, 1.ª série — N.º 175 — 12 de setembro 
de 2016. https://dre.pt/application/conteudo/75307905  
56 Finanças, Decreto-Lei n.º 64/2016, de 11 de outubro. Diário da República n.º 195/2016, Série I de 2016-
10-11, páginas 3590 -3663. https://dre.pt/application/conteudo/75504609  
57 “Regime de comunicação de informações financeiras” (RCIF) (translation by the author). 
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introduced by the Law n.º 82-B/201458, so as to “[fulfil the] obligations assumed by 
the Portuguese Republic within the scope of the mechanisms of international 
cooperation and combating tax evasion provided for in Convention between the 
Portuguese Republic and the United States of America to Avoid Double Taxation and 
Prevent Tax Evasion in Matters of Income Taxes and the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA)”.59 
As per Portuguese domestic law, financial institutions have to report to the 
Portuguese Tax Authority, which then sends the information to the U.S. Competent 
Authority under the terms and conditions of the IGA.60 
3.2.2. FATCA Reporting Requirements  
Under FATCA, FFIs are compelled to enter an FFI agreement with the IRS, 
thus becoming participating FFIs, to avoid being subject to a 30% withholding tax on 
U.S. source payments.61 An FFI can also be considered compliant if it is located in a 
jurisdiction having signed a Model 1 or Model 2 IGA. Reporting Model 2 FFIs are 
participating FFIs as they are located in a Model 2 jurisdiction, which compels them to 
enter an FFI Agreement with the IRS. Other “deemed-compliant” FFIs include: 
registered deemed-compliant FFIs (which are required to register with the IRS), 
certified deemed-compliant FFIs, nonreporting IGA FFIs and, to some extent, owner-
documented FFIs.62 
 
58 Assembleia Da República, artigo 239 º da Lei n.º 82-B/2014, de 31 de dezembro (Orçamento do 
Estado para 2015). Diário da República n.º 252/2014, 1.º Suplemento, Série I de 2014-12-31, páginas 6546-
(74) a 6546-(310).  
59 Ibid. 54, article 2 (1) (translation by the author).  
60 Ibid. 56, article 11 (1) (translation by the author). 
61 Ibid. 45, § 1471 (a). 
62 Ibid. 45, § 1471(a), (b)(2). Internal Revenue Service, Treasury. § 1.1471–1 Scope of chapter 4 and 
definitions. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2017-title26-vol14/pdf/CFR-2017-title26-
vol14-sec1-1471-1.pdf. A registered deemed-compliant FFI means an FFI that is either a (1) local FFI; 
(2) non-reporting member of a Participating FFI group; (3) qualified collective investment vehicle; (4) 
  




An FFI can also elect to be withheld on payments received from recalcitrant 
account holders and Nonparticipating Foreign Financial Institutions rather than to 
deduct and withhold any withholdable payment made to such persons.63 
Certain beneficial owners are exempt from the reporting requirements and any 
payment made to them will not be subject to a withholding tax.64 
FFIs complying with the Chapter 4 reporting requirements have to implement 
extensive due diligence procedures through which each account holder can be correctly 
identified so as so to determine if any financial account – whether it be a depository 
account, a custodial account or equity or debt interest not publicly traded –65 is held by 
a specified U.S. person66 or by a foreign entity with at least one substantial U.S. owner 
(U.S. person with more than 10% of ownership or interests). With respect to U.S. 
 
restricted fund; (5) qualified credit card issuer and servicer; (6) sponsored investment entity and 
controlled foreign corporation or; (7) is treated as a registered deemed-compliant FFI under a Model 
2 IGA or is an FFI, or branch of an FFI, that is a reporting Model 1 FFI that complies with the 
registration requirements of a Model 1 IGA. A certified deemed-compliant FFI means an FFI that is 
either a (1) nonregistering local bank; (2) FFI with only low-value accounts; (3) sponsored, closely held 
investment vehicles; (4) limited life debt investment entities (transitional); (5) Certain investment 
entities that do not maintain financial accounts. A certified deemed-compliant FFI is not required to 
register with the IRS. A nonreporting IGA FFI means an FFI that is a resident of, or located or 
established in, a Model 1 or Model 2 IGA jurisdiction, as the context requires, and that is either a 1) 
nonreporting financial institution described in Annex II of the Model 1 IGA; (2) nonreporting financial 
institution described in Annex II of the Model 2 IGA; (3) registered deemed-compliant FFI; (4) 
certified deemed-compliant FFI; (5) exempt beneficial owner. 
An owner-documented FFI means an FFI that meets the requirements of paragraph (f)(3)(ii).  
63 Ibid. 45, § 1471 (b)(3). 
64 Ibid. 45, § 1471(f). These exempt beneficial owners are (1) any foreign government, any political 
subdivision of a foreign government, or any wholly owned agency or instrumentality of any one or 
more of the foregoing; (2) any international organization or any wholly owned agency or 
instrumentality thereof; (3) any foreign central bank of issue, or; (4) any other class of persons identified 
by the Secretary for purposes of this subsection as posing a low risk of tax evasion. 
65 Ibid. 45, § 1471 (d)(2). 
66 Ibid. 45, § 1473 (3). A specified U.S. person is any U.S. person other than (1) any publicly listed 
company; (2) any corporation which is a member of the same expanded affiliated group as a publicly 
listed company; (3) any organization exempt from taxation under section or an individual retirement 
plan; (4) the U.S. or any wholly owned agency or instrumentality thereof; (5) any State, the District of 
Columbia, any possession of the U.S., any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or any wholly 
owned agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing; (6) any bank; (7) any real estate 
investment trust; (8) any regulated investment company; (9) any common trust fund, and (10) other 
trusts to a certain extent.  
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accounts held (in whole or in part) by a natural person, they will only be subject to 
reporting if the aggregate value of all depository accounts maintained by the same 
financial institution (and any member of its expanded affiliated group) exceeds $50,000  
– unless the financial institution elects to report on all U.S. accounts, regardless of 
value. The information subject to reporting are the name, address and TIN of any U.S. 
account holder or substantial U.S. owner, the account number, the account balance or 
value, and the gross receipts and withdrawals or payments from the account.67 Such 
information has to be reported via a Form 8966 on an annual basis. If a local law 
prevents the financial institution from obtaining the necessary information from the 
U.S. account holder, a waiver of such law needs to be provided by the account holder. 
Any failure to do so will have to result in the closure of the account. 
Any reporting FFI will also have to withhold a 30% tax on passthru payments68 
made to recalcitrant account holders or any other Nonparticipating FFI, as well as on 
passthru payments made to FFIs having elected to be withheld upon in the amount 
that is allocable to recalcitrant account holder or Nonparticipating FFIs. 
The accounts do not have to be reported if they’ve already been subject to 
reporting by another financial institution or by the holder of the account.69  
 
67 Ibid. 45, § 1471(c). 
68 Ibid. 45, § 1471(d)(7). “The term “passthru payment” means any withholdable payment or other 
payment to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment”. The second part of this definition, 
regarding “other payment to the extent attributable to a withholdable payment” refers to so-called 
“foreign passthru payments”. A foreign passthru payment is made when a U.S. Specified Person or 
Recalcitrant Account Holder received indirect payment from a U.S. source through their investment 
in an NPFFI which has invested in an PFFI which invests in U.S. source assets. Whilst the payment 
from the PFFI to the NPFFI is not directly withholdable, being foreign-to-foreign, it would indirectly 
originate from a U.S. source. The concept of the foreign passthru payment was to apply a withholding 
tax on such payments. However, in practice, it is extremely difficult to identify whether a payment is 
attributable to a withholdable payment, and there might be local legal restrictions on doing so for 
payments no directly connected to the U.S. Because of these constraints, the withholding of foreign 
passthru payments is currently deferred and no official definition was published, as the IRS tries to 
find a way to eliminate the loophole. The withholding on foreign passthru payments will only be 
enforced two years from the moment as official definition is published. (83 FR 64757) 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/18/2018-27290/regulations-reducing-
burden-under-fatca-and-chapter-3      
69 Ibid. 45, § 1471(b)(1), (d)(1). 
  




A withholding tax of 30% may also be applicable in the case of withholdable 
payments made to an NFFE, as referred previously, if the NFFE did not provide either 
a certification that it does not have any U.S. substantial owner or the name, address 
and TIN of each of its U.S. substantial owner, the latter being reportable. This 
provision does not apply to exempt beneficial owner to the extent listed in the law not 
to classes of payments posing a low risk of tax evasion.70 
The above-listed requirements may vary depending on the content of the FFI 
Agreement or the IGA, as the case may be. In the case of Portugal, for example, 
pursuant to subparagraph 2 of Article 4 of the Model 1 IGA between the United States 
and the Portuguese Republic, the rules relating to recalcitrant accounts are suspended, 
thereby a Portuguese financial institution is not required to withhold tax under section 
1471 or 1472 of Chapter 4, or to close such accounts, if the U.S. Competent Authority 
receives the information set out in the agreement.71 
3.2.3. The Evolution of FATCA 
FATCA was implemented gradually over time and new changes are still being 
introduced through Notices and Final Regulations, which are promulgated based on 
public-comment. In 2017, the Treasury Department and the IRS issued several notices 
stating their intent to amend temporary regulations through the publication of Final 
Regulations, and providing new temporary guidance until the release of such 
 
70 Ibid. 45, § 1472. Exempted beneficial owners in this case means: (1) any publicly traded corporation; 
(2) any member of the same affiliated group as a publicly traded corporation; (3) any entity which is 
organized under the laws of a possession of the United States and which is wholly owned by one or 
more bona fide residents of such possession; (4) any foreign government, any political subdivision of 
a foreign government, or any wholly owned agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the 
foregoing; (5) any international organization or any wholly owned agency or instrumentality thereof; 
(6) any foreign central bank of issue or; (7) any other class of persons identified by the Secretary for 
purposes of this subsection, and 
71 IGA Model 1, Portuguese jurisdiction. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/FATCA-
Agreement-Portugal-8-6-2015.pdf  
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regulations. In December 2018, following much criticism regarding the compliance 
burden that FATCA imposed on U.S. citizens living abroad, and in response to 
Executive Orders 13777 and 13789, the Treasury Department and the IRS disclosed 
proposed regulations (REG-132881-17) that aimed to mitigate taxpayer burden 
through the narrowing of the scope of certain reporting requirements under Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. Amongst the provisions of REG-132881-17 was the previously 
mentioned deferment of withholding on foreign passthru payments. Other provisions 
concerned the elimination of the withholding on payments of gross proceeds and on 
certain insurance premiums, the clarification of the definition of investment entity, and 
guidance regarding certain due diligence requirements and the refunds and credits of 
amounts withheld.72 In January 2020, part of the proposed regulations published in 
REG-132881-17 were incorporated, with some modifications, in the Final Regulations 
TD 9890,73 whilst the remaining provisions were set to be finalised in another, future 
guidance. The regulations provided, amongst other things, some clarifications on the 
requirement for withholding agents that are a U.S. branches or offices of a financial 
institution to obtain a foreign Tax Identification Number (TIN), whilst allowing the 
collection of such information through a specific type of written statement. 
Despite the constant evolution of FATCA regulations, some issues still persist. 
For example, the question of the withholding on foreign passthru payments, arguably 
a significant remaining loophole, has yet to be solved. And the mandatory collection of 
U.S. TINs with regards to pre-existing account holders subject to reporting remains 
quite controversial since, in practice, as the TIN has only become mandatory in the 
 
72 Regulations Reducing Burden Under FATCA and Chapter 3, REG-132881-17. Federal Register/ 
Vol. 83, No. 242 / Tuesday, December 18, 2018 / Proposed Rules. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-12-18/pdf/2018-27290.pdf   
73 Regulations Relating to Withholding and Reporting Tax on Certain U.S. Source Income Paid to 








United States in 1986, many U.S. citizens who have been living abroad since before 
then do not have one. Under these circumstances, the issue had to be addressed in 
Notice 2017-46, and a relief was provided for Reporting Model 1 FFIs through a 
transition period ending on December 31, 2019, during which the U.S. TINs were not 
required. As of 2020, whilst the TINs are now required to be reported, the issue still 
persists. Reporting Model 1 FFIs are not obligated to close reportable pre-existing 
accounts with no TIN, however the IRS will evaluate if its absence constitutes 
significant non-compliance, which could translate into a Reporting Model 1 FFI being 
considered a Non-Participant FFI.74 This issue has been the source of much 
preoccupation for financial institutions, namely in France where 40,000 such accounts 
are concerned.75 
3.3. The Common Reporting Standard 
The automatic exchange of information in the European Union was the subject 
of years of political back and forth, mainly due to the reluctance of Austria and 
Luxembourg to lift their vetoes regarding the amendment of the Savings Directive after 
several loopholes had been identified. In the end, it took the implementation of 
FATCA and the aggressive push regarding the conclusion of intergovernmental 
agreements between the United States and several Member States to pressure the most 
disinclined governments to release their hold on banking secrecy.76 
 
74 Frequently Asked Questions FAQs FATCA Compliance Legal. Reporting, Q3. 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/frequently-asked-questions-faqs-fatca-compliance-
legal  
75 BURGGRAF, Helen. “French finance minister reassures French banks over FATCA concerns, on 
eve of TIN reporting dead”. American Expat Financial News Journal (01/01/2020). 
https://americanexpatfinance.com/news/item/342-french-minister-reassures-french-banks  
76 GIEGOLD, Sven, MEP. “How Luxembourg resisted European tax cooperation and made money 
with its circumvention”, Chapter 3 (pp. 17-18) (29/05/2017). https://www.greens-
efa.eu/files/assets/docs/pana_hearing_of_jean-claude_juncker.pdf  
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On July 26, 2012, after the introduction of FATCA intergovernmental 
agreements, then-OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría expressed: “I warmly 
welcome the co-operative and multilateral approach on which the model agreement is 
based. We at the OECD have always stressed the need to combat offshore tax evasion 
whilst keeping compliance costs as low as possible. A proliferation of different systems 
is in nobody’s interest. We are happy to redouble our efforts in this area, working 
closely with interested countries and stakeholders to design global solutions to global 
problems to the benefit of governments and business around the world”.77 
The Common Reporting Standard, endorsed by the G20 in September of 2014, 
was adopted by the EU through an amendment of the Directive on Administrative 
Cooperation (DAC2) in December of the same year78, and the Savings Directive was 
repealed on November 10, 2015, due to its consequent overlapping. The standard was 
modelled after the Model 1 intergovernmental agreement in an attempt to minimise 
implementation costs for financial institutions and maximise its efficiency.79 
On a global level, the development of the CRS appeared to be a success, as by 
May 2014, 60 countries had committed to implement the Standard.80 
3.3.1. CRS Domestic and International Legal Framework 
The implementation of the CRS into domestic law can be done with recourse 
to several different legal bases, in such a way that will be in alignment with the local 
 




78 OECD. “A Brief History of AEOI”. https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/about-
automatic-exchange/  
79 OECD. “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, 








restrictions of each jurisdiction. Bilateral agreements can be concluded between two 
jurisdictions via Double Tax Treaties or TIEAs (if AEOI provisions are specifically 
included), or either based on Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital, or on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters. The latter is also the legal basis for the Multilateral 
Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA), which offers a multilateral framework of 
global reach, allowing for two or more parties to enter the agreement whilst ensuring a 
bilateral exchange of information. As of December 24, 2019, 109 jurisdictions had 
signed the MCAA.81 At the European level, Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 
2014 (DAC2)82 was introduced by the Council of the European Union, adopting the 
text of the CRS through the amendment of Directive 2011/16/EU.83 
In order to ensure the proper translation of the CRS into domestic law, it was 
necessary for jurisdictions to implement the requirements through an amendment or 
an addition in legislation. Taking the example of Portugal, Article 188 of the State 
Budget Law n.º 7-A/201684 was the primary legislation introduced with respect to the 
transposition into national law of DAC2, fulfilling the requirement for legislative 
authorisation. The Decree-Law n.º 64/201685 then transposed DAC2 into national 
legislation. The provisions of the Decree-Law established, namely: (1) the categories of 
reporting financial institutions and financial accounts and the specific data which the 
Tax Authority is obliged to report; (2) the categories of non-reporting financial 
institutions, as well as the list of excluded accounts which are low risk and meet the 
 
81 Signatories of The Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account Information and Intended First Information Exchange Date: Status as of 24 
December 2019. https://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/crs-mcaa-signatories.pdf  
82 Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. OJ L 359, 16.12.2014, p. 1–29. 
83 GUTIERREZ, Jorge A. F. and GONZÁLEZ-BARREDA, Pablo A.H. “Combating Tax Avoidance 
in the EU: Harmonization and Cooperation in Direct Taxation”. Kluwer Law International B.V. (2018). 
84 Assembleia Da República, artigo 188º da Lei n.º 7-A/2016 de 30 de março. Diário da República, 1.ª 
série — N.º 62 — 30  de  março  de  2016.  
85 Ibid. 56 
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regulatory requirements; (3) the concrete financial information that must be the object 
of communication and exchange, in respect to income categories and the account 
balances and assets; (4) the set of procedures that must be applied by the reporting 
financial institutions in terms of communication and due diligence and; (5) the rules 
that must be observed in the processing of data by the reporting financial institutions, 
the Tax Authority and the Member States or other jurisdictions receiving the 
information exchanged, in order to safeguard fundamental rights and personal data 
protection principles. Several other amendments, described in article 188 of Budget 
Law n.º 7-A/2016, were also made to other pre-existing legislations in order to 
harmonise the implementation of the CRS into national law. 
Out of the jurisdictions having committed to first exchanges under the CRS by 
2019, 98% had the required domestic legal framework in place and, to date, 104 
jurisdictions have implemented the international legal framework.86 
3.3.2. CRS Reporting Requirements 
A Reporting Financial Institution, according to CRS guidelines, is a Financial 
Institution located in a Participating Jurisdiction87 that is not a Non-Reporting 
Financial Institution, as per the provisions of the agreement. With respect to branches 
of a Financial Institutions (FIs), only branches located in a Participating Jurisdiction 
are subject to the reporting rules of such jurisdiction. The location of an FI is mainly 
determined by its tax residence, or by the jurisdiction wherein the financial accounts 
are located, if the FI is resident in multiple jurisdictions. An entity which does not have 
a tax residence will be treated as resident of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated, 
in which it has its place of management or in which it is subject to financial supervision. 
 
86 OECD. “The 2019 AEOI Implementation Report” (pp. 10) (2019). 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/AEOI-implementation-report-2019.pdf   
87 A jurisdiction having implemented the CRS. 
  




Trusts are considered to be residents in the jurisdiction where its trustees are residents 
unless it is considered tax resident of another jurisdiction.  
A Reporting Financial Institution, for the purposes of the CRS, is any of the 
following: a depository institution (e.g. savings banks, commercial banks, savings and 
loan associations, credit unions); a custodial institution (e.g. custodian banks, brokers, 
central securities depositories); an investment entity (e.g. entities investing, reinvesting 
or trading in financial instruments, portfolio management or investing, administering 
or managing financial assets) or; a specified insurance company (e.g. most life insurance 
companies). Non-Reporting Financial Institutions – i.e. financial institutions that are 
exempted from the reporting – are similar to the Exempt Beneficial Owners defined 
in FATCA and can be any of the following: a governmental entity and its pension 
funds; an international organisation; a central bank; certain retirement funds; a qualified 
credit card issuer; an exempt collective investment vehicle; a trustee documented trust 
or; other low-risk financial institutions.88 
Similarly to FATCA, Reporting FIs have to apply extensive due diligence 
measures in order to identify would-be reportable financial accounts. Financial 
accounts, under the CRS, are depositary accounts, custodial accounts, equity and debt 
interest in certain investment entities, cash value insurance contracts and annuity 
contracts. Some accounts are, however, considered low-risk and therefore excluded 
from reporting; for those accounts no due diligence needs to be enacted.89 
Reportable Financial Accounts are the financial accounts maintained in a 
Reporting Financial Institution which are subject to reporting to the tax authority of 
the jurisdiction in which the FI is located. A Reportable Account is “an account held 
 
88 OECD. "Commentaries on the Common Reporting Standard", in Standard for Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters, Second Edition, OECD Publishing, Paris (pp. 158-
174) (2017). https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264267992-7-en 
89 Ibid. (pp. 175-191). Excluded accounts are, as listed in the CRS, (1) retirement and pension accounts; 
(2) non-retirement  tax-favoured accounts; (3) term life insurance contracts; (4) estate accounts; (5) 
escrow accounts; (6) depositary accounts due to not-returned overpayments and; (7) other low-risk 
excluded accounts. 
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
42 
 
by one or more Reportable Persons or by a Passive NFE with one or more Controlling 
Persons that is a Reportable Person”.90     
The CRS defines a Reportable Person as a Reportable Jurisdiction Person – an 
individual or entity resident in a Reportable Jurisdiction (i.e. a jurisdiction having an 
obligation to exchange information as per the agreement in place with the jurisdiction 
in which the Reporting FI is located) – other than a publicly traded corporation or its 
related entities, a governmental entity, an international organisation, a central bank or 
a financial institution. 
A Reporting Financial Institution therefore has to identify any financial account 
held by one or more Reportable Persons for effects of reporting, in which case the 
accounts are reported in relation to the Account Holder and the name, address, 
jurisdiction(s) of residence, TIN(s) and date and place of birth of the Reportable 
Persons are collected, as well as the account number, amongst other things.91 
The other type of Reportable Account, which is reported in relation to the 
Controlling Persons, are Passive NFEs with one or more Reportable Persons as 
Controlling Persons. Passive NFEs are one of two categories of Non-Financial 
Entities. Non-Financial Entities, as categorised in the CRS, are entities that are not 
Financial Institutions, and can either be Active or Passive. An Active NFE can be any 
of the following: a publicly traded NFE; a governmental entity; an international 
organisation; a central bank or its wholly owned entities; a holding NFE that is member 
of a nonfinancial group; a start-up NFE; an NFE that is liquidating or emerging from 
bankruptcy; a treasury centre that is member of a nonfinancial group; a non-profit NFE 
or; an active NFE by reason of income and assets (less than 50% of the NFE’s gross 
income for the preceding calendar year is passive income and less than 50% of the 
assets held by the NFE during the preceding calendar year are assets that produce or 
are held for the production of passive income). Essentially, Passive NFEs are NFEs 
 
90 Ibid. (pp. 191) 
91 Ibid. (pp. 94-101) 
  




that are not considered Active, i.e. entities with passive income and assets that produce 
or are held to produce passive income. In addition, any Investment Entity managed by 
another Financial Institution that is not located in a Participating Jurisdiction will also 
be considered as a Passive NFE. 
If an Account Holder is a Passive NFE, the Controlling Persons have to be 
identified in order to determine whether the account should be reportable. The 
Controlling Persons are usually the natural persons having direct or indirect ownership 
of the entity (owning, through shares or voting rights, more than a certain percentage, 
determined through a risk-based approach, usually either 10% or 25%), or, when no 
natural persons exercise control through ownership, any natural persons who exercise 
control of the Entity through other means (e.g. senior managing official).92 If one or 
more Controlling Persons of a Passive NFE is identified as a Reportable Jurisdiction 
Person, their financial accounts will be considered reportable and the name, address, 
jurisdiction(s) of residence and TIN(s) of the Entity will be collected along with the 
name, address, jurisdiction(s) of residence, TIN(s) and date and place of birth of each 
Reportable Person and their account number, amongst other things.93 
Jurisdictions may opt to adopt the Wider Approach, which, as described in 
Annex 5 of the CRS, allows jurisdictions to extend the definition of Reportable Persons 
to include all non-residents, residents of jurisdictions with which they have an exchange 
of information agreement, and even their own residents in order to alleviate the burden 
on jurisdictions in implementing the CRS and on Financial Institutions having to 
comply with reporting requirements. Each jurisdiction can also create a list of low risk 
non-reporting FIs and excluded accounts, which is made publicly available on the 
OECD’s Automatic Exchange Portal.94 
 
92 Ibid. (pp. 195-199) 
93 Ibid. (pp. 94-101) 
94 OECD “Automatic Exchange Portal”. https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-
implementation-and-assistance/crs-by-jurisdiction/   
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3.3.3. The Evolution of the CRS 
Constant developments are made to maintain the CRS up to date and relevant. 
In February of 2018, a loophole regarding the use of residence or citizenship by 
investment schemes was identified, where the CRS could potentially be circumvented 
through the inaccurate or incomplete reporting of a taxpayer’s tax residence. The 
OECD released consultation documents addressing the issue and identified a list of 20 
countries with “high-risk” schemes, however the efforts to close down on this loophole 
remains insufficient, as analysed later in this document.95  
In March of 2018, the OECD released the new Model Mandatory Disclosure 
Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque Offshore Structures (MDRs),96 
which was based on the BEPS Action 12 Report97 and specifically targeted schemes 
created to avoid CRS reporting or hide ultimate beneficial owners, by making it 
mandatory for certain financial intermediaries to disclose such schemes to tax 
authorities. Amongst the definitions of “CRS Avoidance Arrangements” is the 
arrangement that seeks to “[undermine  or  exploit] weaknesses  in  the  due  diligence  
procedures  used  by  Financial Institutions to correctly identify an Account Holder 
and/or Controlling Person or all  the  jurisdictions  of  tax  residence  of  an  Account  
Holder  and/or  Controlling Person”. These new disclosure rules were essential for the 
 
95 OECD. “OECD clamps down on CRS avoidance through residence and citizenship by investment 
schemes” (2018). https://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-clamps-down-on-crs-avoidance-through-
residence-and-citizenship-by-investment-schemes.htm 
96 OECD. “Model Mandatory Disclosure Rules for CRS Avoidance Arrangements and Opaque 
Offshore Structures”, OECD, Paris (2018). www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-information/model-
mandatory-disclosure-rules-for-crs-avoidance-arrangements-and-opaque-offshore-structures.pdf  
97 BEPS refers to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. They are aggressive tax planning tactics used by 
multinational corporations to “[exploit] gaps and mismatches between different countries' tax 
systems”, mainly through the shifting of profits to OFCs. In an effort to combat such tactics, over one 
hundred countries joined the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS, which released the “BEPS 
Package”, providing a set of 15 Actions to be implemented by countries to tackle tax avoidance. Action 
12 delivers “recommendations for the design of rules to require taxpayers and advisors to disclose 
aggressive tax planning arrangements”. https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/  
  




purpose of guaranteeing the efficacity of the CRS reporting, as such arrangements 
would undermine the efforts of financial institutions to determine which account is to 
be considered reportable. In June of 2019, the OECD released an international 
framework for the exchange of information collected under the MDRs, including a 
draft of the multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on which the exchanges were 
to be based. 
At the European level, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation kept 
evolving, introducing new obligations for financial institutions in Member States. As 
of June 2020, Directive 2011/16/EU had been amended five different times in order 
to include the automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border tax rulings 
and advance pricing agreements, the mandatory automatic exchange of information on 
country-by-country reporting of multinational corporations, the access by tax 
authorities to beneficial ownership information collected by financial institutions 
pursuant to the anti-money laundering Directive and the automatic exchange of 
information of reportable cross-border tax-planning arrangements. The mandatory 
disclosure rules set out by the BEPS Action 12 report were adopted by EU Member 
States through the enactment of Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 (DAC6), 98 
the latest amendment to Directive 2011/16/EU. DAC6 established a “specific 
hallmark concerning automatic exchange of information and beneficial ownership”, 
incorporating the OECD MDRs, under which certain arrangements are considered as 
undermining the reporting obligations of Member States regarding the AEOI of 
financial account information and targeting arrangements obfuscating the beneficial 
ownership chain. DAC6 introduces another dimension to the issue by specifically 
targeting cross-border arrangements, attending to the fact that most aggressive tax-
planning arrangements have a transnational nature. Under DAC6, certain EU-based 
 
98 Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-
border arrangements. OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1–13.   
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
46 
 
financial intermediaries are required to disclose information on reportable cross-border 
tax-planning arrangements to their local tax authority, which then have to share the 
information with tax authorities of other Member States. The Directive presents a list 
of hallmarks, i.e. indications that an arrangement or transaction could be used for tax 
avoidance purposes. A cross-border arrangement becomes reportable when at least one 
of the hallmarks is met. Arrangements concerning the automatic exchange of 
information and beneficial ownership, transfer pricing, and certain types of cross-
border transactions do not have to meet the “main benefit test” to be reportable. The 
main benefit test applies to arrangements from which the main benefit a person can 
reasonably expect to derive is the obtaining of a tax advantage, as per defined in Annex 
IV of the Directive. The intermediaries targeted by the provisions are mainly tax and 
financial advisers, accountants, lawyers or any person linked with the planning, 
managing or marketing of reportable cross-border arrangements. As per Article 25a, 
the provisions pursuant to DAC6 have to be transposed to domestic laws by the 
Member States, and the penalties associated to the infringements of such provisions 
have to be determined by each Member State. 
In Portugal, the transposition of DAC6 into domestic law was drafted in bill n.º 
11/XIV/1.ª, published in May 2019 and approved by the Assembly of the Portuguese 
Republic on May 28, 2020. The bill, if promulgated by the President of the Republic, 
would repeal the Decree-Law n.º 29/2008, which introduced duties of communication 
to the tax administration to prevent and combat abusive tax planning, due to 
overlapping provisions. It has, however, been highly criticised due to the fact that the 
scope of obligations proposed is much broader than the one required by DAC6. For 
example, the bill would be applicable for arrangements both with or without a cross-
border dimension as long as they are designed to be applied or produce effects in the 
Portuguese territory. The most controversial provision proposed by the bill concerns 
the prevailing of reporting duties by intermediaries over their legal or contractual 
professional privilege, which pushed the Portuguese Bar Association, the National 
  




Data Protection Commission, the Chartered Accountants Association and many others 
to issue negative opinions regarding the bill, denouncing the provision as being a 
violation of the principles of the rule of law. Indeed, whereas the Directive specifically 
refers that Member States are allowed to give intermediaries the right to a waiver when 
a reporting obligation would originate a breach of legal professional privilege under 
national law, therefore transferring the obligation to another intermediary or to the 
taxpayer benefitting from the arrangement, bill n.º 11/XIV/1.ª simply discards the 
option.99 Such is a good example of minimum harmonisation, in which case a Member 
State is allowed to set stricter standards than the ones set in the Directive. As of June 
2020, DAC6 had been transposed into the national law of 19 of the 27 Member States. 
3.4. Main Differences Between FATCA and CRS 
The Common Reporting Standard has sometimes been referred to as the 
“global version” of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, due to the similarities 
between the two and attending to its goal to create a global standard for the automatic 
exchange of information for tax purposes.100 
Whilst the CRS was indeed based on the intergovernmental agreements drafted 
for FATCA purposes,101 there are several key differences that separate the two.  
Firstly, FATCA was initially conceived as a unilateral regulation, meant to 
pressure financial institutions into reporting the movements of foreign accounts held 
by U.S. taxpayers. The transnational nature of the regulation was only contemplated 
 
99 Presidência do Conselho de Ministros. “Proposta de Lei 11/XIV”. 
https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalheIniciativa.aspx?BID=44417  
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due to conflicts between the reporting requirements and the domestic law of some 
foreign countries, which hindered the compliance of financial institutions with the 
regulation.102 Conversely, the CRS was created specifically as a multilateral standard to 
be implemented globally. Additionally, whereas under FATCA participating financial 
institutions have to report directly to the IRS, there is no cross-borders reporting 
provision in the CRS as financial institutions have to report to their local tax authority.  
One of the most glaring distinctions between both regulations concerns the 
withholding tax, which is the main tool used by the FATCA regulation to ensure 
compliance from foreign financial institutions. This concept is completely absent from 
the CRS, which has led to some controversies amongst the commentariat, mainly due 
to the fact that the United States, home to several OFCs, did not commit to 
implementing the CRS, instead choosing to benefit from a significant imbalance in 
reporting requirements. Whilst the IGAs are reciprocal to some degree, foreign 
financial institutions are generally required to report a larger amount of information 
and are the only ones subject to sanctions in case of non-compliance.103 This disparity 
is apparent in the IGA Model 1 concluded between the United States and the Republic 
of Portugal, in which Portuguese financial institutions are not only required to report 
U.S. Account Holders, but U.S. Controlling Persons of a Non-U.S. Entity as well. In 
the case of the United States, the reporting only centres on any Account Holder that is 
an individual resident of Portugal, and the amount of information to be divulged is 
much more limited.104  Thus, U.S. financial institutions will not report any information 
regarding any type of account held by an Entity or by a Non-Portuguese Entity with 
Portuguese Controlling Persons. In contrast, the CRS is fully reciprocal unless the 
 
102 PARADA, Leopoldo. “Intergovernmental Agreements and the Implementation of FATCA in 
Europe”. World Tax Journal, 2015 (Vol. 7), No 2. (24/06/2015). 
103 “Why Europe should impose withholding taxes on payments, to crack open secretive tax havens”. 
Tax Justice Network (21/01/2016). http://www.taxjustice.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/TJN2016_WithholdingTax.pdf  
104 Ibid. 71, article 2(2). 
  




chosen agreement between two jurisdictions is specifically non-reciprocal (e.g. for 
jurisdictions with no income tax).105 
  Other dissimilarities concern the distinction between U.S. Persons 
(classification based on nationality) and Reportable Persons (classification based on tax 
residence), the type of documentation required from the client in order to classify them 
(U.S. tax documents versus a Self-Certification), the scope of information required 
from the client (in the case of the CRS, the tax residence and place of birth are 
additional requirements), the distinction made between beneficial owners and 
controlling persons (controlling persons may include senior managers, and the term 
only applies in IGAs and in the CRS) and the registration requirements for reporting 
financial institutions (FFIs have to register with the IRS whilst no such registration 
system exist under the CRS).106 
Finally, the identification and classification of accounts differs from FATCA to 
CRS. Whereas under the CRS, the date from which accounts are considered new 
depends on the date at which the jurisdiction started exchanging information (January 
1st, 2016, for early adopters), under FATCA new accounts are invariably the ones 
opened from July 1st, 2014, the day the regulation came into effect. In regards to the 
identification of new and pre-existing individual accounts, the CRS does not consider 
any de minimis reporting threshold, meaning all new and pre-existing individual accounts 
need to be reviewed.107 Under FATCA, there is generally a de minimis threshold of 
$50,000, except with regards to pre-existing individual account for cash value insurance 
or annuity contract, for which the de minimis threshold is $250,000. The FATCA 
provision for pre-existing individual accounts ceases to apply if the account balance or 
 
105 OEDC. “Commentaries on the Model Competent Authority Agreement” (pp. 65). OECD 
Publishing, Paris (2017). https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264267992-en 
106 GLYNN, Laura. “CRS – Implementing Best Practices for Tax Compliance” (pp. 6-7) (2016). 
https://www.fenergo.com/resources/whitepapers/crs-implementing-best-practice-for-
compliance.html  
107 Ibid. 88, commentary on section III and IV.  
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value exceeds $1,000,000 as of the end of any subsequent calendar year.108 Under the 
CRS, an individual pre-existing account does not need to be reviewed, identified, or 
reported if it is a cash value insurance contract or an annuity contract and the Reporting 
Financial Institution is prevented by law from selling such contracts to residents of a 
Reportable Jurisdiction.109 On the subject of new entity accounts, again, there aren’t 
any de minimis reporting threshold with regards to the CRS,110 as opposed to the $50,000 
de minimis reporting threshold of the aggregate balance or value of the account under 
FATCA. The threshold rises to $250,000 for pre-existing entity accounts, if no holder 
of such accounts has been previously identified as a specified U.S. Person. Again, the 
provision ceases to apply once the aggregate balance or value exceeds $1,000,000 at the 
end of any subsequent calendar year.111 CRS establishes a de minimis reporting threshold 
for pre-existing entity accounts, which are not subject to review if the aggregate account 
balance or value does not exceed $250,000 as of the last day of the calendar year.112 
The implementing jurisdiction may, however, opt out of this exception.113 
Overall, whilst similarities between FATCA and the CRS were inevitable given 
the effort of the OECD to limit the cost of implementation of the Standard for both 
jurisdictions and financial institutions, it appears that the CRS is still much broader in 
scope. Nonetheless, core requirements are sufficiently paralleled that basic due 
diligence procedures can be harmonised. 
 
 
108 Internal Revenue Service, Treasury. § 1.1471–4 (c)(5)(iii)(A) FFI Agreement. 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2013-title26-vol12/pdf/CFR-2013-title26-vol12-sec1-
1471-4.pdf  
109 Ibid. 88, commentary on section III. 
110 Ibid. 88, commentary on section VI. 
111 Ibid. 108, § 1.1471–4 (c)(3)(iii)(A) 
112 Ibid. 88, commentary on section V. 
113 Ibid. 88, commentary on section V(A). 
  




The Impact on Financial Institutions 
This chapter centres around the implications of the shift towards the automatic 
approach for the exchange of tax information in regards to financial institutions, the 
burden of implementation of due diligence procedures and the penalties for non-
compliance, as well as the review of potential measures that could alleviate the impact. 
4.1. Compliance Cost 
Any financial institution located in a CRS participating jurisdiction, or any 
financial institution with connections to the United States market has been impacted 
by the introduction of FATCA and CRS in the sphere of international taxation. The 
reporting requirements imposed on these financial institutions called for the 
implementation of new extensive due diligence procedures, which, at the time, sparked 
concerns regarding the potential cost of such undertaking. In 2011, the American 
Citizens Abroad, a non-profit organisation advocating for the rights of U.S. citizens 
residing outside of the United States, urged Americans to lobby the U.S. Congress for 
the repeal of FATCA. One of the organisation’s concerns was that the costly IRS 
reporting requirements was causing FFIs to start denying financial services to U.S. 
clients.114 The New Zealand Bankers' Association, along with the Australian Bankers’ 
Association and Canadian and British industry groups, opposed the legislation, fearing 
that the compliance cost could  get as high as NZ$100 million for the New Zealand 
 
114 “Americans urged to lobby Congress on FATCA”. International Adviser (07/09/2011). 
https://international-adviser.com/americans-urged-lobby-congress-fatca/  
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financial industry.115 James Broderick, then head of JP Morgan's European, Middle 
Eastern and African asset management business, estimated that FATCA would cost 
financial institutions up to $100 million each, and that the total cost of implementation 
would be equal to the amount of money FATCA was set to raise in 10 years.116 Finally, 
a 2014 survey from Thomson Reuters found that, out of approximately 300 financial 
institutions, 27% expected that the cost of implementation of due diligence procedures 
with respect to FATCA would be between $100,000 and $1 million, compared to 16% 
in 2014. This 11% increase demonstrates how the burden of FATCA was initially 
underestimated by financial institutions.117 More concretely, the introduction of 
FATCA is said to have cost Canada’s five biggest banks $693.5 million,118  whilst the 
Government of the United Kingdom estimated that the implementation cost of 
FATCA under its IGA would be up to £1.6 billion for UK financial institutions.119 In 
France, the French Banking Federation informed that the cost for French banks was 
around €200 million, not including recurrent costs which were around 20% of the cost 
of implementation, nor other types of financial institutions.120 
A report from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration from 
2018 found that the IRS spent $380 million on the drafting and enactment of FATCA, 
 
115 VAUGHAN, Gareth. “NZ banks, fearing NZ$100 mln bill, work with Australian, Canadian and 
British on changing 'unworkable' US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act” (06/09/2011). 
https://www.interest.co.nz/news/55211/nz-banks-fearing-nz100-mln-bill-work-australian-canadian-
and-british-changing-unworkable-  
116 WOOD, Robert W. “FATCA carries fat price tag”. Forbes (30/11/2011). 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/11/30/fatca-carries-fat-price-tag/#4e2c584e4ae9   
117 “Thomson Reuters Survey Indicates FATCA Compliance to Cost More Than Anticipated”. Global 
Banking & Finance review (08/11/2014). https://www.globalbankingandfinance.com/thomson-reuters-
survey-indicates-fatca-compliance-to-cost-more-than-anticipated/  
118 TRICHUR, Rita. “Canada Banks Tally Their Tax-Compliance Tab”. The Wall Street Journal 
(27/07/2014). https://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-banks-tally-their-tax-compliance-tab-
1406504252   
119 “The cost of complying with FATCA – similar initiatives to follow?”. Herbert Smith Freehills 
(03/06/2013). https://hsfnotes.com/fsrandcorpcrime/2013/06/03/the-cost-of-complying-with-
fatca-similar-initiatives-to-follow/  
120 Sénat, Session Extraordinaire n. º 751. “Rapport FATCA” (pp. 35) (17/07/2014). 
https://www.senat.fr/rap/l13-751/l13-7511.pdf  
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which suggests that the majority of the financial burden of implementing the legislation 
was borne by FFIs and foreign governments.121 As a result, some smaller institutions 
with few American customers opted to close their accounts, in an effort to keep the 
expenditures down. Such was the case of French-based Axa Bank, which counted with 
less than 150 American customers. Jean-Marc Vasseux, Risk, Control, and Compliance 
Director of AXA Banque, explained the decision taken as follows: “Keeping our 
relationships with [U.S. customers] required heavy adaptations: we therefore chose not 
to continue. This decision was difficult to make because they were loyal customers.”.122    
As for the costs associated to the implementation of CRS, whilst the standard 
was based off FATCA as to, in part, minimise compliance costs for financial 
institutions by allowing them to repurpose their pre-existing processes, the broader 
scope of the CRS inherently added to the complexity of the infrastructure, driving up 
the costs of implementation. Supports and procedures had to be reviewed, and new 
essential trainings had to be deployed.  In 2015, the estimated compliance cost impact 
for Australian financial institutions alone was around $45 million per year.123 
4.2. Implementation and Current Challenges 
Most financial institutions did not have a system in place to automatically 
identify certain accounts based on the FATCA and CRS requirements. In January 2013, 
 
121 “Despite Spending Nearly $380 Million, the Internal Revenue Service Is Still Not Prepared to 
Enforce Compliance with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act” (05/07/2018). 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2018reports/201830040fr.pdf  
122 Finance Committee Report. “Implications for France of the American "FATCA" legislation and 
prospects regarding the development of the automatic exchange of information in tax matters” 
(12/02/2014). http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20140210/fin.html#toc6   
123 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives. “Tax Laws 
Amendment (Implementation of the Common Reporting Standard) Bill 2015: Explanatory 
Memorandum”. 
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2015B00229/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text  
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
54 
 
a research showed that 65% of financial institutions were struggling to meet FATCA 
client identification requirements due to infrastructure deficiencies.124 Another survey 
from 2012 found that the main compliance challenge for FATCA implementation 
would lie with the account identification requirements, followed by documentation 
requirements and system changes.125 The absence of reporting threshold and the 
multilateralism of the CRS translated into the obligation to review what could amount 
to thousands of accounts spanning several jurisdictions, depending on the financial 
institution. The information to be reviewed and reported is generally not centralised in 
one business segment, meaning that financial institutions had to plan an important 
restructuration permitting the collection of such information in an efficient manner. In 
a survey from 2016, 62% of 80 financial institutions reported not having the necessary 
software solutions in place to meet FATCA and CRS requirements.126 The complexity 
of implementation also varies depending on the number of jurisdictions in which a 
financial institution operates, as the requirements for both FATCA and CRS differ 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in which case procedures have to be adapted in order 
to ensure the correct classification and reporting of accounts. Currently, financial 
institutions are still facing recurrent expenditures associated with the maintenance of 
systems and procedures. As the regulations are ever evolving, they must do their 
upmost to keep their procedures up to date, and plan for further eventual changes. 
The client experience was also greatly impacted by the introduction of new legal 
requirements. The on-boarding processes became much more complex, attending to 
 
124 “65% of financial institutions expect FATCA client identification to be moderately or extremely 
difficult”. Fenergo (08/01/2013). https://www.fenergo.com/company/news/press-releases/65-of-
financial-institutions-expect-fatca-client-identification-to-be-moderately-or-extremely-difficult-says-
fenergo.html  
125 “Surveying the market: Are you ready for FATCA?”. KPMG International (12/2012). 
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/01/surveying-market-are-you-ready-for-
fatca.pdf  
126 “Thomson Reuters Survey Reveals More than Half of Financial Institutions Are Concerned about 
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the fact that new clients were required to fill out several additional forms, which can 
be challenging to comprehend and may require legal assistance. Whilst financial 
institutions can, to some degree, re-use client data and documentation previously 
collected, the necessity to identify beneficial owners and controlling persons of some 
accounts, which is often subject to change, implies that client contact is mostly 
inevitable. There is sometimes an additional necessity to certify that previously 
collected information is still valid (e.g. an entity that was classified as an Active NFE 
can, in some circumstances, become passive by reason of income and assets). 
Furthermore, if a client maintains several accounts with different institutions or 
different branches belonging to the same group, it might happen that the client is 
contacted to answer to different requests for the same documentation, which could 
lead to client dissatisfaction. Inefficient on-boarding procedures and repeated 
information requests may equally lead to loss of business,127 which is why the data and 
information of each client should be centralised in a database accessible by any relevant 
player. Such a solution, however, is not simple to implement, partly due to domestic 
privacy law restrictions. 
Financial institutions now have to juggle their customers’ rights to privacy and 
data protection with the expanding scope of data reportable under different 
regulations. Whilst FATCA and CRS provisions have seriously curtailed the concept 
of bank secrecy everywhere, privacy and data protection at the European level are seen 
as fundamental rights. In the European Union, the exchange of information has to 
comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), and 
whilst the processing of data is lawful under Article 6 of the regulation, some have 
argued that the broad requirements imposed by FATCA and CRS do not meet the data 
minimisation principle defined in Article 5. DAC2 introduces the notion that Reporting 
 
127 GLYNN, Laura. “CRS Remediation - Complexity, Cost and Impact on Client Relationships”. 
Fenergo (08/2016). https://www.fenergo.com/resources/blogs/crs-remediation-complexity-cost-and-
impact-on-client-relationships.html  
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Financial Institutions are considered to be data controllers, and as such have the duty 
to inform Reportable Persons about the information being collected and transferred 
pursuant to the Directive. Such information also has to be provided at an early stage, 
before the data is reported, in order to allow the Reportable Person to exercise their 
data protection rights.128 In addition to the duty of informing Reportable Persons and 
to only retain the collected information for as long as is necessary to achieve the 
purposes of DAC2, financial institutions have to be extremely careful in the handling 
of customers data in order to avoid any breach of confidentiality and data protection 
obligations. Such a breach could lead to customer distrust and reputational damage. 
Financial institutions therefore have to be mindful of their data protection policy, and 
reporting mistakes should be avoided at all costs. 
Another important hurdle that financial institutions continue to face is the 
adequate training of employees involved in the identification, reviewing, classification 
and reporting of each customer account. FATCA and CRS are both very complex 
regimes, with many specificities and exceptions to be applied depending on the type of 
account or client and, therefore, ensuring proper compliance inevitably means 
employees need to be well-informed, kept up to date, and qualified. Mistakes can be 
costly, and an investment in training would most likely be beneficial in the long run. 
4.3. The Penalties for Non-Compliance 
As previously reported, if a Foreign Financial Institution, that is not exempt 
from the registration requirement, chooses not to register with the IRS and comply 
with FATCA-introduced reporting requirements, the FFI will be subject to a 30% 
withholding tax on U.S. source payment made to them. If there are omissions or 
 
128 Ibid. 82, article 1(5). 
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inaccuracies in the report of a Reporting Financial Institution, an error notification will 
provide a certain number of days to fix the issue before the IRS evaluates if there is an 
issue of significant non-compliance. The penalties for non-compliance by a Reporting 
Financial Institutions located in a country subject to an IGA may vary depending on 
each agreement. According to the agreement signed between the United States and 
Portugal, the competent authorities have to notify each other when a case of non-
compliance is identified, and the domestic laws of each country apply. There is an 
additional provision that if a Portuguese financial institution does not resolve the issue 
of non-compliance within 18 months after notification, the financial institution will be 
treated as a Nonparticipating Financial Institution by the United States and will be 
subject to withholding.129 In most Model 2 IGA, the financial institution found to be 
non-compliant is given twelve months after notification to rectify the issue before it is 
treated as a Nonparticipating FFI. 
The non-compliance with the provisions of the CRS vary depending on the 
jurisdiction. For instance, in the case of Portugal, Article 5 of the Decree-Law n.º 
64/2016, which amends Article 7(C) of the Decree-Law n.º 61/2013, of May 10, 
stipulates the consequences of failure to comply with legal obligations by financial 
institutions. If there are omissions or inaccuracies in the information communicated to 
the Tax Authority, the financial institution will be notified through a new 
communication. If there is a case of non-compliance with the provisions of the Decree-
Law, the financial institution will equally be notified by the Tax Authority, and asked 
to correct or supply the missing information, or to adopt or correct its due diligence 
procedures. In any case, or if there is an event of non-compliance with the obligation 
to maintain registration with the Tax Authority, the financial institution shall be subject 
to the penalties set forth in the General Regime of Tax Infractions,130 approved by Law 
 
129 Ibid. 71, article 5(2). 
130 Ibid. 57, Article 7(C). 
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
58 
 
n.º 15/2001, of June 5, which can amount to €45,000 in case of negligence or to 
€165,000 in case of intent.131 
Despite the challenges introduced by the necessity for financial institutions to 
comply with FATCA and CRS reporting requirements, non-compliance is rarely a 
viable option, as the consequences would be quite significant. 
4.4. Methods to Mitigate the Impact  
The biggest impact financial institutions have to mitigate, in regards to FATCA 
and CRS requirements, is the increase in expenditures. The only apparent method to 
avoid such increase is by either restricting some accounts with regards to American 
citizens, which won’t be as effective now that the CRS introduced broader reporting 
requirements, or by being compliant. It is important that any financial institution 
looking to be compliant starts by investing in specialists. The practical implementation 
of FATCA and CRS is complex, and a detailed understanding of both regulations is 
paramount in order to avoid wasting time or resources. The main objective should be 
implementing a system that is functional and efficient from the beginning, as there are 
many business segments that need to interact with each other and if not properly 
harmonised, it could lead to errors in the identification, classification and reporting of 
clients that would be costly to fix. It is more and more evident that a fragmented system 
can lead to errors, delays, and overall client dissatisfaction, especially if they are being 
solicited by different segments of the same entity. There are no one-size-fits-all 
approach that don’t involve some kind of internal restructuring; however, some 
financial institutions have resorted to employ an external software provider to manage 
 
131 Assembleia Da República, artigo 26 º da Lei n. º 15/2001 de 5 de Junho (amended by Lei n.º 64-
B/2011, de 30 de Dezembro).  Diário Da República — I Série-A N.º 130 — 5 de Junho de 2001 
https://dre.pt/application/conteudo/322110   
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the client lifecycle whilst ensuring regulatory compliance. In a time where financial 
regulatory requirements of all kind keep rising, and financial institutions’ business lines 
are still lacking interconnectivity, client lifecycle management has become a logistical 
nightmare. Owing to that, new financial technologies and regulatory technologies are 
starting to populate the landscape of the financial sector, allowing for the digitalisation 
of manual processes that burdened back and middle office operations.132 
Conclusively, financial institutions should opt for a combination of several 
solutions to mitigate the impact of new regulatory requirements, ranging from the 
proper training of employees to the centralisation of documentation and data (in as few 
segments as possible whilst complying with data privacy laws) and the automation of 
screenings and data management. 
 
132 GUPTA, Pranay and THAM, T. Mandy. “Fintech: The New DNA of Financial Services” (pp. 396-
418). Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG (2018). 
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The Present and Future of FATCA and CRS 
This chapter reviews the latest developments regarding FATCA and CRS and 
aims to identify current potential issues, as well as to take a look at the next challenges 
which will have to be undertaken. 
5.1. Current Situation 
The start of the automatic exchange of information under the CRS is quite 
recent, having begun in 2017 for the early adopters, and the Global Forum intended to 
conduct peer reviews regarding the effectiveness of its implementation during 2020. 
However, in total, from January to November 2019, around 6,100 bilateral exchanges 
were made between the 94 jurisdictions exchanging information, which is 36% more 
than in 2018.133 As of June 2020, over 100 jurisdictions have committed to implement 
or have implemented the CRS. That is already a huge accomplishment that would have 
seemed impossible to achieve a decade ago, mainly due to the fact that it appeared 
OFCs would never cooperate on the matter. Today, most OFCs and conduit-OFCs 
(i.e. jurisdiction through which a disproportional amount of value moves toward 
OFCs) identified by the University of Amsterdam’s OFC Meter134 are participating in 
the automatic exchange of information for tax purposes. 
 
133 Ibid. 86 
134 GARCIA-BERNARDO, Javier, et al. “Financial Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global 
Corporate Ownership Network”, Scientific Reports 7, article 6246, (2017). 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-06322-9.pdf. OFC Meter. https://www.ofcmeter.org/  
Automatic Exchange of Information: 
The rise of FATCA and CRS and consequent challenges for financial institutions 
62 
 
Nevertheless, the regulation is not perfect, and a 2018 Report commissioned by 
the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament135 shows that there are still some 
loopholes that need to be addressed. A revision of DAC2 and, by extension, of the 
CRS found that the enforcement of the regulation was insufficient, due mainly to the 
lack of sanctions for OFCs that choose to simply abstain from the exchange of 
information with selected countries. Secondly, the “golden visa” system136 was found 
to facilitate tax avoidance schemes by circumventing the tax residence approach to 
identification of reportable persons, as defined in the CRS, through the 
misrepresentation of a golden visa holder’s tax residence and thus sending the financial 
accounts information to the jurisdiction issuing the golden visa. If a person obtains a 
golden visa in an OFC with no income tax, which has opted to enforce non-reciprocal 
bilateral agreements (according to which the OFC has to share information but does 
not receive it), the information regarding any of their accounts will not be subject to 
reporting. In response to this issue, the OECD released a list of 20 countries with 
“potentially high-risk” golden visa schemes and published a practical guidance urging 
financial institutions to request more information from any account holder they might 
suspect of using a golden visa from one of the listed countries.137 It is worth noting, 
however, that only two EU countries were identified (Malta and Cyprus), while a 
reported 13 EU Member States have such a system in place. There are also still many 
financial entities that are not targeted by the regulation, and the information being 
exchanged can only be used for taxes purposes, due to privacy concerns.      
As for FATCA, 113 jurisdictions currently have agreed to a Model 1 or Model 
2 IGA and more than 350,000 financial institutions are registered with the IRS. 
 
135 KNOBEL, Andres. “Reporting taxation: Analysing loopholes in the EU’s automatic exchange of 
information and how to close them” (15/10/2018). http://extranet.greens-efa-
service.eu/public/media/file/1/5729  
136 A residency-by-investment system allowing foreign citizens to make a qualifying investment in a 
jurisdiction and thereby be granted a residence permit from such jurisdiction. 
137 Ibid. 95  
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However, a 2018 report138 showed that very little had been done by the IRS to ensure 
compliance with FATCA. The main problem seemed to be in regards of the lack of 
TINs in many forms, which, as analysed before, is an issue that still remains unsolved.  
The United States also has yet to commit to the CRS, and remains unwilling to 
do so. After essentially coercing OFCs and many foreign countries to comply with 
FATCA through the use of threats of significant financial penalties, the U.S. now 
enjoys a special status allowing it to receive financial information on all its citizens and 
green card holders whilst giving no or very limited information to other countries. As 
observed by the commentariat, the U.S. has, in a way, positioned itself to become the 
world’s tax haven.139 The situation was acknowledged by the United States 
government, with the Department of the Treasury addressing a letter to the House of 
Representatives in 2016 in which he urges: “Reciprocity with other jurisdictions is a 
key component of any successful strategy for combatting international tax evasion”.140 
In order for the U.S. to agree to such exchanges it would first have to introduce new 
laws requesting more ample information from its financial institutions. However, a 
2019 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) advises against the 
commitment to the CRS by the United States, with the following statement: “While 
better aligning FATCA and CRS to some extent is possible, anything short of the 
United States fully adopting CRS would not fully eliminate the burdens of overlapping 
requirements that FFIs must currently meet under the two different systems. While 
having the United States adopt the CRS reporting system in lieu of FATCA could 
benefit FFIs that may otherwise have to operate two overlapping reporting systems, it 
 
138 Ibid. 121 
139 “The U.S. Is Becoming the World’s New Tax Haven” (28/12/2017). Bloomberg. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-28/the-u-s-is-becoming-the-world-s-new-
tax-haven  
COTORCEANU, Peter. “Why America Loves Being the World’s No. 1 Tax Haven”. Politico Magazine 
(08/04/2016). https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/04/panama-papers-america-tax-
haven-213800  
140 “Lew to Ryan on CDD” (05/05/2016). https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Lew%20to%20Ryan%20on%20CDD.PDF  
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would result in no additional benefit to IRS in terms of obtaining information on U.S. 
accounts. Additionally, it could generate additional costs and reporting burdens to U.S. 
financial institutions that would need to implement systems to meet CRS requirements. 
The extent of these costs is unknown. Further, adoption of CRS would create the 
circumstance where foreign accounts held by U.S. citizens with a tax residence in 
partner jurisdiction—including U.S. citizens who have a U.S. tax obligation—would 
not be reported to IRS”.141 The concern regarding the lack of reporting of U.S. citizens 
with a tax residence in a partner jurisdiction is, however, a misconception, as the CRS 
Implementation Handbook clearly states: “Since under US tax law a US citizen is  also  
a  US  tax  resident, the  Model 1 FATCA IGA provides that both US citizens  and  US  
residents are included in the definition of US person […]. The approach taken in the 
Standard definition generally determines residence under the tax laws of a Reportable 
Jurisdiction. Because in the case of the US, a US tax resident includes a US citizen and 
a US resident, the approach in the Model 1 FATCA IGA is consistent with the 
Standard […]”.142 In short, the United States’ choice not to adopt the CRS is a purely 
political one. There were some reports that the European Union would add the United 
States to its 2019 blacklist of tax havens,143 allowing Member States to take “effective 
and proportionate defensive measures”,144 but as of June 2020, such decision has yet 
to be taken. 
 
141 GAO. “Foreign Asset Reporting: Actions Needed to Enhance Compliance Efforts, Eliminate 
Overlapping Requirements, and Mitigate Burdens on U.S. Persons Abroad”. GAO-19-180 (04/2019). 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698133.pdf    
142 OECD. “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters: 
Implementation Handbook”, (pp. 134). OECD Publishing, Paris (2017). 
https://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/implementation-handbook-standard-for-
automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax-matters.pdf  
143 KIRWIN, Joe. “EU’s Expanded Tax Haven Blacklist Could Apply to U.S.”. Bloomberg Tax 
(13/12/2018). https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-international/eus-expanded-tax-
haven-blacklist-could-apply-to-us-1  
144 Council of the European Union (05/12/2017). “The EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for 
tax purposes: Council conclusions”, (pp. 5). Official Journal, ST 15429 2017 INIT. 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15429-2017-INIT/en/pdf  
  
 Chapter 5: The Present and Future of FATCA and CRS 
65 
 
5.2. Next Challenges 
Whilst the progress in matters of international tax cooperation and transparency 
has been noteworthy, much remains to be done. Indeed, as noted by economist Gabriel 
Zucman, for the automatic exchange of information to be truly effective in combatting 
tax evasion and tax avoidance, it invariably needs to be global, otherwise tax evaders 
will simply transfer their assets to another OFC.145 To that end, the EU and OECD 
tax havens blacklists’ criteria need to be amended in order to set any political 
consideration aside. It is no coincidence that the Cayman Islands were only classified 
as a non-cooperative jurisdiction by the EU in the wake of Brexit,146 and the Tax Justice 
Network has previously accused the OECD of electing its criteria carefully in favour 
of the U.S. secrecy framework.147 According to the Financial Secrecy Index created by 
the Tax Justice Network, which takes secrecy and offshore financial activities into 
account, the U.S. is the second worst offender, whilst Switzerland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany all figure in the top 15. The United 
Kingdom would take first place if it were considered one single entity along with its 
overseas territories and crown dependencies, of which three are also in the top 15, with 
the Cayman Islands coming in number 1.148 
The second step in promoting the effectiveness of the automatic exchange of 
financial accounts information is the introduction of sanctions on non-cooperative 
 
145 ZUCMAN, Gabriel. “Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits”, 
(pp. 144). Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 28, Number 4—Fall 2014—Pages 121–148 (2014). 
146 BOFFEY, Daniel. “In wake of Brexit, EU to put Cayman Islands on tax haven blacklist”. The 
Guardian (13/02/2020). https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/feb/13/eu-to-put-cayman-
islands-on-tax-haven-blacklist  
147 KNOBEL, Andres. “Blacklist, whitewashed: How the OECD bent its rules to help tax haven USA”. 
Tax Justice Network (27/07/2018). https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/07/27/blacklist-whitewashed-
how-the-oecd-bent-its-rules-to-help-tax-haven-usa/  
148 Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index (2020) https://fsi.taxjustice.net/en/introduction/fsi-
results .  
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OFCs and the establishment of a reward system for whistle-blowers, at the global level. 
This will somewhat prevent corruption and encourage compliance. Moreover, the 
current loopholes identified regarding the CRS must be solved, as they currently 
undermine the purpose of the regulation. 
Finally, as of June 2020, 45 developing countries having committed to the 
automatic exchange of information still haven’t set a date for the first exchange. This 
is mostly due to the fact that bilateral and multilateral agreements under the CRS 
require the reciprocal exchange of information, and that most developing countries 
lack the internal infrastructure needed to be able to meet reporting requirements. While 
the Global Forum did draft a Plan of Action149 in 2017 for the participation of 
developing countries in AEOI, in which it is acknowledged that developing countries 
are highly affected by issues of tax avoidance and tax evasion, the assistance provided 
so far appears insufficient. For example, Isabel dos Santos, daughter of Angola's former 
president and Africa’s richest woman, who has been one of the targets of a campaign 
to root out corruption, has recently been accused of taking advantage of the U.S. 
secrecy framework to hide her assets.150 As it was estimated that, in 2016, 44% of 
Africa’s financial wealth was held offshore, this kind of illicit practices are draining 
poorer countries and slowing their development.151 In the pursuit of a fair and 
transparent international tax landscape, it is paramount that developing countries be 
afforded the same opportunities with regards to the automatic exchange of financial 
accounts information. 
The OECD should strive to fortify the current regulations in place and promote 
their implementation on a global level if it is to be fully efficient.
 
149 OECD. “The Global Forum’s Plan of Action for Developing Countries Participation in AEOI” 
(11/2017). https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/plan-of-action-AEOI-and-developing-
countries.pdf   
150 SULEYMANOVA, Ramlila. “Hiding money: US is a major hub of financial secrecy, says report”. 
Aljazeera (18/02/2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/hiding-money-major-hub-financial-
secrecy-report-200217165131298.html  
151 Ibid. 5 
  





The aim of this dissertation was to analyse the automatic exchange of 
information through the FATCA and CRS regulations and assess their impact on 
financial institutions.  Whilst it is too early to draw conclusions regarding the potential 
positive repercussions the introduction of both regulations had on the global loss of 
revenue occasioned by tax non-compliance, the impact on financial institutions was 
immediate and of much importance. 
FATCA, as the first regulation to be enacted, resulted in ample compliance costs 
due to the necessity for restructuring and the implementation of new systems. The 
CRS, being broader in its scope, had similar repercussions. However, the concurrent 
managing of two different types of reporting requirements, even if overlapping, 
signifies a greater burden for financial institutions and, as exposed in the previous 
chapter, there doesn’t appear to be any legitimate justification as to why FATCA 
shouldn’t be repealed. While both regulations diverge in some regards, it is mainly due 
to the wider, multilateral application of the CRS, and not due to its more restrictive 
nature. The 2019 report from GAO worries about the potential cost for U.S. FIs if the 
United States were to adopt the CRS, but such position seems extremely dishonest as 
the United States pressured foreign financial institutions to bear the majority of the 
cost resulting from FATCA. By mentioning that the adoption of the CRS would result 
in no “additional benefit to IRS in terms of obtaining information on U.S. accounts”, 
the report blatantly disregards the benefit that it would represent for other countries, 
with which it would exchange on a basis of reciprocity. Moreover, it overlooks the 
commitment made by the United States in the intergovernmental agreements to 
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“[pursue] the adoption of regulations and [advocate] and [support] relevant legislation 
to achieve […] equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information exchange”.   
For the impact of FATCA and CRS on financial institutions to be justifiable, 
the regulations in place must be effective. By now, it is evident that FATCA, while 
promoting pseudo-multilateralism through the conclusion of intergovernmental 
agreements, remains a unilateral legislation. Yet, as previously mentioned, for the 
automatic exchange of financial account information to be successful it has to be 
implemented globally. The current inequality between the United States and the rest of 
the world is therefore unsustainable, as the U.S. has currently positioned itself as the 
world’s tax haven, and should be addressed by the European Union and by the OECD.  
Ideally, the Common Reporting Standard should be the only standard 
implemented globally, so that the impact on financial institutions can be mitigated and 
global tax transparency optimised. 
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